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NOTES
INTERNATIONAL LAw-NATIONALITY OF THE CORPORATE PERSON.-

The nationality of the fictional corporate person presents interesting
problems in domestic and international law. Although the concepts
of nationality and citizenship are not strictly applicable to such artificial person, corporations are endowed with them by the courts and
legislatures for economic and political purposes. Among the many
problems to which the concept of nationality has been applied to corporations are the following, which are the most prominent: (a) the
status of a corporation, whether enemy or alien, in time of war; (b)
questions of jurisdiction in suits at law; (c) applicability of tax statutes; (d) elegibility for consular recognition and protection in foreign
countries; and (e) status under treaties. No one rule for the determination of nationality has been accepted by the various nations, they
1 Arminjon, Treatise on the Nationality of Corporations, Document No. 53,
Spanish Treaty Claims Commission (1907).
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preferring to apply various criteria to the different situations encountered. One writer 1 has listed the approaches to this problem under
the following six headings:
1. The corporation takes the nationality of the state which authorizes its existence.
2. The nationality of the corporation is determined by that of the
country within whose jurisdiction it has been organized.
3. The nationality of the corporation is determined by the nationality of the stockholders.
4. The corporation takes the nationality of the country of subscription or domicile of the majority of the shareholders at the
time of subscription.
5. The nationality of the corporation is the same as that of the
country where it has its principal place of business.
6. The judge shall determine the nationality of the corporation in
accordance with the facts which have been enumerated.
Without any attempt by the writer to criticise the above classifications, it may be stated that at the present time the three most widely
employed rules are numbers 1, 3, and 5, although there is a discernible
2
pragmatic tendency toward rule 6 in some courts.

A discussion of

the various situations will reveal the application of these rules to
specific cases.
Status of a corporation, whether enemy or not, in time of war.Trading with the enemy.-The Trading with the Enemy Act of the
United States 3 defines as an enemy, ". ..any corporation incorporated
within such (enemy) territory ...

or incorporated within any country

other than the United States and doing business within such territory."
These tests of corporate nationality have been adopted in the Trading
with the Enemy Acts of most nations. Thus in the British Act, 4 an
enemy is defined as "any body of persons constituted or incorporated,
in, or under the laws of, a State at war with His Majesty." The
French Act 5 makes similar provisions for the determination of enemy
status, as does the Order in Council of the Norwegian government-inexile, of May 18, 1940.6
The German Act 7 employed a slightly broader application of the
same tests in that "all corporations, the original legal personality of
2 In re Daimler v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., 2 A. C. 307, (1916), the
various opinions showed a definite tendency toward a strict fact finding attitude,
the judge being advised to consider all the facts in forming his opinion, regardless of any arbitrary criterion.
3 Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 Fed. Register 1400 (April 10, 1940).
4 Trading with the Enemy Act, 2&3 Geo. 6, c. 89 (Sept. 5, 1939).
5 Journ. OR., p. 11093 (September 4, 1939).
6 Norsk Lovtidend, No. 2, p. 40 (1940).
7 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 191 (Jan. 15, 1940).
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which is based on the laws of an enemy state" were deemed enemies.
Under this rule, the London branch of a Swiss bank with main offices
in Switzerland was considered an enemy, as was a corporation whose
office was in a neutral country, but which was constituted under enemy
law, for example, an international cartel which transferred its main
office from Paris to Switzerland during the war. 8 The acts of other
nations have followed a similar pattern.9 They regard incorporation
under the laws of an enemy state and doing business in enemy territory as conclusive tests of the status of the corporation.
The same criteria have been employed in various regulations issued
in the United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The
General Orders of the Alien Property Custodian include in the term
"foreign national" "any business organization, organized under the laws
of, or having its principal place of business within designated foreign
countries." 10 In the U. S. Censorship Regulations an enemy national
includes "any organization to the extent that it is actually situated
within enemy territory." 11 The Regulations relating to the Transportation of Enemy Aliens on American Vessels and Aircraft provide
that the term "enemy" shall mean "any corporation incorporated within such (enemy) territory of any nation with which the United States
is at war or incorporated within any country other than the United
States and doing business within such territory." 12
In addition to these tests, however, every major nation with the
exception of the United States, has adopted the rule that control of a
corporation by enemy aliens will render the corporation an enemy, no
matter under whose law or in what country it was organized. The
necessity for such a rule is obvious when we regard the anomaly of
domestic or neutral corporations whose stock is held by enemy aliens
and whose officers and agents are, or are under the control of, alien
enemies. The question of the application of the control doctrine was
thoroughly argued 'in the first World War in the celebrated case of
Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co.13 Here a company
was organized under the laws of England and had its principal office
in London. Of the twenty-five thousand shares of stock, one was
owned by the secretary of the company, a naturalized British citizen,
the rest being in the hands of German nationals resident in Germany.
8 Moehring, Die Behandlung feindlichen Vermoegens, 7 Zeitschrift der Akadamie fUr Deutches Recht 125 (1940).
9 For a -full discussion of the subject and a more adequate documentation,
the reader is referred to Domke, Trading with the Enemy in World War 11 (1943).
10 Sec. 2 General Order No. 2, sec. c(4) General Order No. 14, sec. 2(ii)
General Order No. 15.
11 U. S. Censorship Regulations sec. 1801.2 (c) (3), 8 Fed. Reg. 1644 (1943).
12

13

(1916).

Sec. 22.1 (b), 8 Fed. Reg. 2820 (1943).
Daimler Co., Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., Ltd., 2 A. C. 307
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The secretary instituted suit in the English court to collect money owing it by a British corporation, they having refused to pay on the
grounds that to do so would be trading with the enemy. Although the
case was decided on a technicality, the principal discussion concerned
the application of the control doctrine in similar situations. The
opinion of Lord Parker of Waddington met the question squarely.
"Such a company," he said, "may, however, assume an enemy character.
This will be the case if its agents or the persons in de facto control of
its affairs, whether authorized or not,; are resident in an enemy country,
or, wherever resident, are adhering to the enemy or taking instructions
from or acting under the control of enemies. A person dealing with the
company in such a case is trading with the enemy." He proceeded to
state that the character of the individual shareholders cannot of itself
affect the character of the company-but goes on to say that it may
be considered in determining the character of its agents- or the persons
in de facto control. As a result of this case and later decisions applying it,1 4 the doctrine of control became a part of the British Trading
with the Enemy Act of World War 11,15 where the expression "enemy"
includes "any body of persons (whether corporate or uncorporate)
carrying on business in any place, if and so long as the body is controlled by a person who, under this section, is an enemy." The Trading with the Enemy Acts of Canada, 16 Australia, 17 and New Zealand ' 8 are similar, and the continental European nations have the
same provision in their Acts.' 9 As we have stated, the United States
has not incorporated this doctrine into its Act and, as we shall see later,
our courts have refused to apply the doctrine to any of the other
situations to be discussed.
Even among the nations who have ascribed to it, the criteria of
control have not been settled. In the Canadian Consolidated Regulations respecting Trading with the Enemy, 20 and the New Zealand
Trading with the Enemy Regulations, 2 ' the fact that "one-third or
more of the issued share capital or of the directorate of a company"
has been held by enemy aliens, provides the legal basis for considering
a corporation an enemy. Other Acts are silent on this point, making
the determination of the domestic or enemy status of a corporation
14 See The Hamborn, A. C. 993, where the court expressly accepts Lord
Parker's dictum in the Daimler case (1919).
15 Trading with the Enemy Act, 2&3 Geo. 6, c. 89, sec. 2(1)c (Sept. 5, 1939).

16
17
1942).
18

Sec. 1(b)iii, sec. la.
National Security Regulations, Statutory Rules 1942 No. 268 (June 19,
R. 3(1).

19 For a fuller discussion see Domke, Trading with the Enemy in World
War I, ch. 8, 9, appen. A to S.
20
21

Order in Council P. C. 3959, August 21, 1940, as amended.

The New Zealand Gazette, No. 91, p. 2355 (September 4, 1939).
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largely within the arbitrary powers of the courts administering the
Acts. The omission is probably intentional.
The refusal of United States courts and legislatures to employ the
doctrine of control has led to some interesting decisions. In HamburgAmerican Line Terminal and Navigation Co. v. United States,22 the
plaintiff was a domestic corporation, but all of its stock was held by
an enemy, the Hamburg-American Line, a German corporation. The
court, in holding it to be an American, within the meaning of the Trading with the Enemy Acts, said, "It (Congress) definitely adopted the
policy of disregarding stock ownership as a test of enemy character
and permitted property of domestic corporations to be dealt with as
non-enemy." In a similar case, the Supreme Court of the United
States stated, "Before its passage the original Trading with the Enemy
Act was considered in the light of difficulties certain to follow disregard of corporate identity and efforts to fix the status of corporations
as enemy or not according to the nationality of the stockholders. These
had been plainly indicated by the diverse opinions in Daimler Co. v.
Continental Tyre and Rubber Co.... And we find no support for the
suggestion that Congress authorized the taking of property of other
corporations because one or more stockholders were enemies." 23 During World War II the question arose again in Toa Kigyo Corporation
v. Offenberger,2 4 where the stockholders of the United States corporation were non-resident Japanese nationals and the manager was a
resident Japanese national. Here again the actual character of the
corporation was ignored and the rule remained unchanged.
The problem arises in reverse when the stockholders of a corporation situated in enemy territory are non-enemies and seek to have the
corporation regarded as a non-enemy for that reason. This question
was dealt with in the case of H. P. Drewry S. A. R. L. v. Onassis.2 5 In
this case the plaintiff was a French corporation with its registered office and place of business in Paris. Most of the stock of the corporation was held by a British subject who fled to England when France
was occupied. The court refused to regard the corporation as a nonenemy, saying, "to permit the nationality and residence of stockholders
to dictate the decision in cases of this character would mean that
American owned corporations incorporated and having their residence
in enemy territory would be exempt from the operation of the law.
277 U. S. 138, 96 S. Ct. 470, 72 L. Ed. 822 (1928).
23 Behn, Meyer and Co., Ltd. v. Miller (Alien Property Custodian) 266
U. S. 457, 45 S. Ct. 165, 69 L. Ed. 374 (1925).
24 N. Y. L. J., p. 687 (Feb. 14, 1942); cf. Fritz Schulz, Jr. Co. v. Raimes &
Co., 100 Misc. 697, 166 N. Y. S. 567 (1917); cf. Martinez v. La Associacion de
22

Senoras Danas del Santo Asilo de Pance, 213 U. S. 20, 25 (1909) where it was
held that a corporation under the laws of Spain in Puerto Rico was, after the
United States took over, "If a citizen of any country, a citizen of Puerto Rico."
25 N. Y. L. J., p. 1496 (Nov. 17, 1942).
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Such a result could make a travesty of the Trading with the Enemy
Act in many instances. It is the nationality and residence of the
corporation that controls, not that of the stockholders." The fact that
all the assets of the corporation were removed from France before the
Germans arrived was of no avail before the court; "Even if we assume
that the plaintiff's sympathies are with the United Nations - and
that assumption is seemingly justified - the legal status of the plaintiff
remains unaltered. The Trading with the Enemy Act makes no distinction between an enemy in law and an enemy in spirit. Sympathies
of the persons affected cannot sway the result. Whoever comes within
the sweep of the definition is an enemy!"
The injustice and poor logic of this rule in application are patent.
A more comprehensive criticism of it will be found in a subsequent
part of this paper dealing with the jurisdiction of courts.
Prior to the Daimler case, the British test for the nationality of
corporations in time of war was the "commercial domicile" of the corporation. By this was meant the actual place of business of the company-its residence. In the application of this test the nationality of
the stockholders or officers was not considered. 26 Since that case, however, the English courts have applied the control test to questions other
than those arising under the Trading with the Enemy Act. In The Hamborn,2 7 the question of liability for condemnation as prize arose where
the ship in question was owned by a Dutch corporation, all of whose
stock was in the hands of Germans. The court expressly accepted
Lord Parker's dictum in the Daimler case and, applying it to the
present situation, held that the Dutch ship was actually a German
and subject to condemnation. As recently as 1943, a British court ap28
plied the doctrine of "commercial Domicile" in the case of The Pamia.
In this case the property in question was owned by a Belgian corporation which had moved its offices to the United States when Belgium
was occupied. It was held that the company was not an enemy since
its residence was in the United States.
26 The nationality of stockholders was expressly ignored in the following cases
applying the doctrine of "commercial'domicile": Janson v. Drifontein Consolidated
Mines A. C. 484 (1902) (suit for collection of insurance on losses during Boer
war by South African Corporation whose stockholders were English); V/O
Sovracht v. N. V. Gebruder van Uden's Scheepvaart en Agentuur Maatschappij,
1 All. E. R. 76 (1943), 59 T. L. R_ 101 (Dutch Corporation enemy after invasion
and occupation by Germany); Gebruder van Uden v. Burrell (1916) S.C. 391
(Scotch decision-same holding) ; In re Merten's Patents (1915) I K. B. 857 (Suit
to revoke patents granted to German company whose stockholders were British;
cf. Societ6 Anonyme Bedge des Mines D'Aljustrel (Portugal) v. Anglo-Belgian
Agency, Ltd. (1915) 2 Ch. D. 409, where it was held that a Belgian corporation
was not an enemy because Germany had only partially occupied the country, and
therefore part of Belgium was still friendly.
27 A. C. 993 (1919).
28 112 L. J. P. 34 (1943).
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In Australia, the control doctrine is generally applied. In re G.
Hardt and Co. Pty. Ltd.,2 9 an Australian importing and exporting
company whose stock was owned by Germans was held to be of enemy
character, and a comptroller appointed to manage its affairs. Under
French Law the court does not regard the nationality of the shareholders as decisive, but applies the tests of enemy character to them.
Thus, in S. A. Les Parfums Tosca,30 the enemy character of the corporation was denied, although the controlling stock was owned by a
German national, because he resided in the then neutral Netherlands,
31
and was not on the blacklist. Likewise, in the Societe Le Zenith,
the corporation was controlled by German refugees in France who had
not been interned, and in Spielman, Herman et Spielman, Ernst,32 the
principal stockholders were Austrian refugees who were no longer connected with their former Viennese firm and were resident in neutral
countries. On the other hand, in Societe Somatex,3 3 enemy character
was given to a corporation whose controlling interest was in two German nationals who had returned to Germany when war began. Here
the test was not stock ownership, the court placing its decision on the
fact that the Corporation had a capitalization of 50,000 francs, but
was indebted to a German creditor in the amount of 1,000,000 francs,
payment for which had never been asked. The French have adopted
a realistic attitude toward corporations, formerly friendly, but controlled by persons in occupied territory. Instead of declaring them
enemies, they have recognized that these French corporations no longer
depended on any effective control from abroad.3 4
German doctrine of control were the most liberal, the nationality
of shareholders being only one of many criteria employed in the determination of enemy character. Sufficient control could also be shown
by long term loans, contracts of sale and other factual considerations
wherein a material influence might have been exercised in the management of the corporation. On the other hand, a domestic corporation
under enemy control was not an enemy under German law since it
"belongs to the economic sphere of the Reich and a major part of its
profits remains in the German economy." 35 Instead, the corporation was placed under the special administration of an officer of the
29

13 Australian L. 3. 425 (1940) (High Court of Australia, December 16,

1939).
30 Dalloz. Hebd. 1940, 11 (November 16, 1939); Recuil Gazette du Palais
1939, II 360.
31 Dalloz Hebd. 1940, 35 (January 3, 1940); Recuil Gazette Palais 1940 I 78.
32 Recuil Gazette Palais 1940 I 370 (March 7, 1940).
33 Dalloz Hebd. 1940, 22 (November 3, 1939); Recuil Gazette Palais 1939
II 338.
84 Decrees of May 2, 1940 (Journ. Off. May 3, 1940, p. 3230) and June 1,
1940 (Journ. Off. June 3, 1940, p. 4183).
35 23 Hanseatische Rechts und Gerichtszeitung B. 115, 123 (1940).
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government.8 6 While the determination of enemy character is in the
courts, in most countries, in Germany it was in the conclusive determination of the Reich Minister of Justice.8 7 The administrative determination of enemy character has been adopted to some extent in this
country, also, executive orders under the Trading with the Enemy Act
giving the Secretary of the Treasury, 38 and the Alien Property Custodian 89 the right to determine, for the purposes of their offices, the
enemy character of persons, including corporations.
Jurisdiction of Courts.-As was shown above, the United States
Trading with the Enemy Act does not regard the control of the corporation as a factor in determining enemy character of corporations.
The courts of this country have adopted a similar rule for the determination of nationality and citizenship in peace-time cases. Although
the majority of the decisions on this problem arise under determination
of diversity of citizenship involving American corporations, the rule has
been inflexibly applied to other types of cases. Notable among these
is the Amtorg Corporationv. United States cases. 40

Here the plaintiff

was a corporation organized under the laws of New York, engaged in
importing matches from Soviet Russia. All the stock in plaintiff corporation was owned by agencies of the Soviet government. Defendants
contended that jurisdiction in the Federal court should be denied because, at that time, the government of the United States had not
recognized the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. It was the position of the defendants that this corporation was an instrumentality of
the Soviet government, and, since that government was not recognized
by ours, to allow it to appear in our courts would be to extend the
court's authority beyond that of the Department of State. The court
agreed that the Soviet government or one of its agencies could not
sue, but held that this corporation was a citizen of the State of New
York, and thus entitled to maintain the action. This is a strict application of the United States rule which states that "for the purposes
of jurisdiction, the stockholders are conclusively presumed to be citizens
of the state of incorporation." 41 A glance at the history of this rule
may show how it has developed and the extent to which such an application as the above is a perversion of it.
Originally, the rule was that the nationality of the corporation depended on the nationality of its stockholders, and in order to remain
86 cf. Federal Supreme Court of the Reich (Reichsgericht), July 10, 1934,
Juristiche Wochenschrift 1934 p. 2969 No. 1.
87 Sec. 12(2) of the decree of January 15, 1940, Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 191;
cf. Hefermahl, Das feindliche Vermoegen, 10 Deutches Recht p. 1217, 1220 (1940).
88 Executive Order No. 8389 in sec. SE, April 10, 1940, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400
(1940).
89 Executive Order No. 9095, in sec. 10 (a).

71 F. (2d) 524 (1934).
41 Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railway Co., 16 How. 314, 14 L. Ed. 953
(1853).
40

NOTES
in the Federal courts it was necessary for the corporation to show that
none of its stockholders were citizens of the same state as the opposite
party. 42 As a practical result, it was almost impossible for a corporation to get into the Federal courts. To correct this situation, the rule
was formulated that the corporation would be considered a citizen of
the state of incorporation. 43 This proved only partially satisfactory,
as lawyers soon grasped upon the technicality that a corporation can
not be a citizen within the meaning of the United States Constitution.
Finally, apparently in desperation, the court proposed the present rule
which conclusively presumes that all the stockholders are citizens of
the state of incorporation.44 For the purpose for which it was formulated, that is for the purpose of fixing the status of corporations in
determining their nationality for purposes of jurisdiction in the Federal
courts in cases involving diversity of citizenship, the rule is admirable.
The difficulty arises when this rule, with its limited scope and definite
purpose, is extended to situations which were not considered by the
formulators of the rule and to factual relations which have no relation
to that upon which the rule was predicated.
In fact, not only has this rule been blindly applied by the courts in
such cases as Amtorg Corporation v. United States, discussed above,
but it has, by its weight been carried over into the statutory law
of our country, as has been shown in the section of this paper dealing with Trading with the Enemy Acts. There, where it was shown
that our courts, in time of war, ignore the patent enemy character of a
corporation and regard only the place of incorporation, the distortion
of the purpose of the rule was even more obvious.
Occasionally a court rebels at this rule and applies one which it considers more just and logical. Notable is the case of Doctor v. Harrington.45 Plaintiffs were residents of New Jersey and stockholders in
defendant, a corporation under the laws of New York. The action was
brought in equity to set aside and vacate a judgment obtained by the
influence of the majority stockholder, the plaintiffs maintaining that
the judgment was based on his illegal action. The defendant insisted
that the Federal court was without jurisdiction, since the plaintiffs
must be considered citizens of the state of incorporation of defendant,
and that therefore the requisite diversity of citizenship was lacking.
Happily, the court refused to adopt this view, and, after discussing the
background of the rule, decided that the presumption was valid only
when necessary to do justice. Here, the court pointed out that an application of such an artificial rule would be unjust. If the action had
42 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch. 61, 3 L. Ed. 38 (1809); Hope
Insurance Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch. 57, 3 L. Ed. 36 (1809).
43 Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 11 L. Ed. 353 (1844).
44 Marshall v. B. & 0. R. Co., supra, n. 41
45 196 U. S. 579, 25 S. Ct. 355, 48 L. Ed. 606 (1905).
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been at law, what would the result have been? The court would
probably have felt itself bound to apply the rule regardless of the
question of justice.
In FarEastern Recreation Grounds, Limited, v. MetropolitanSporting Association, Incorporated,46 a case brought before the United States
Court for China, the action was dismissed when it was shown that the
corporation, although organized under American law, was actually controlled by aliens, and had only a nominal American interest.
The I'm Alone case 47 involves a similiar disregard of the United
States rule. The I'm Alone was a ship of Canadian registry. During
the era of prohibition in this country the I'm Alone was sighted off
the Eastern coast of the United States by a revenue cutter which immediately gave chase. As a final result, the ship was sunk and the
Canadian Department of State protested, alleging that at the time the
chase started the I'm Alone was outside the territorial limits of the
United States and that the docrine of "hot pursuit" had been violated.
A joint committee for reparations was chosen and refused to enforce
the Canadian claims because the ship, although of Canadian registry,
was owned and controlled by Americans. These isolated instances are
the only ones encountered by the writer in which the United States
rule has not been strictly applied. In both the Chinese case and the
I'm Alone, the proceedings had more of a diplomatic and less of a
judicial character, and it is probably this fact that accounts for the
results. At any rate, the only noted exceptions to the United States
rule seem to fail as true exceptions. In one, the rule was disregarded
by a court of equity because its application would be grossly unjust.
In the other, the diplomatie character of the proceedings served to
fend off the rule. In no case of a suit at law, however, had the rule
been disregarded.
Applicability of Tax Statutes.-In the United States the law is
well settled on this subject. A corporation may be taxed in any state
in which it does business to the extent of the business carried on. The
only problems arising under this doctrine, those being what constitutes
doing business in a certain jurisdiction and how the extent of business
done is to be calculated, are not within the scope of this paper. The
English courts, in distinguishing between residence for income tax purposes and for the purpose of "serving a writ," 48 have adopted the
same view. In the leading case on this subject, 49 a corporation in46

195 (ns.) North China Herald

(June 19, 1935) 492 (1935).

joint Final Report of the Commissioners (Jan. 5, 1935) Department of
State, Arbitration Series 2(7) (1935).
48 Calcutta Jute Mills v. Nicholson; Cesana Sulphur Co. v. same (1876)
1 Ex. D. 428.
49 De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. Howe (Surveyor of Taxes) A. C.
455 (1906); cf. Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co., Ltd. v. Todd A. C.
47

1, (1929).
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corporated under the laws of the Union of South Africa was being sued
by the British government for income tax. The corporation carried
on most of its business in England, and this was held to be the determining factor, the court holding that the corporation was liable for the
tax. The logic of such a position is unquestionable.
Eligibility for Consular Protection in Foreign Countries.-As was
shown in discussing the I'm Alone 50 and Far Eastern Recreation
Grounds 51 cases, our Department of State does not feel itself bound
by the United States rule as to determination of corporate nationality
if the question involved is of a diplomatic nature. This attitude may
be more clearly shown by reference to some diplomatic communications.
In a communication from Secretary Hughes to the Consul General at
Shanghai, it is stated; 52
"The Department considers that under the law a corporation
organized in the United States is to be regarded as a citizen of
the United States regardless of the American financial interest involved and for jurisdictional purposes in China is ordinarily to be
treated as such. The question, however, as to the extent to which
this Government should afford such a corporation assistance in a
foreign country is one which may properly be governed in a large
measure by the nature and extent of the American interest involved."
A similar view is reflected in other communications of the Department
of State.53 This more practical view is advisable in the circumstances
in which it applies. A corporation applying for United States protection in a foreign country should contain a substantial American
interest. The consequences of protecting corporations merely because
they are incorporated under American laws, and with complete disregard for the actual interests involved are obviously undesirable.
Status Under Treaties.-The question of the status of corporations
under treaties is largely one of construction. In the event the treaty
does not specifically speak of the rights of corporations, as such, and
only speaks generally of citizens or nationals, then it is necessary for
those applying the treaty to ascertain what rights and privileges were
intended to be bestowed upon"corporations.54
By way of summary, it may be stated that the fundamental problem
of how to establish the nationality of a corporation may be attacked
in two ways. One way is to adopt one rule and apply it inflexibly to
50 Supra,n. 47.
51 Supra, n. 46.

52 MS. Department of State, file 893.05/45, Dec. 13, 1924.
53 This subject is discussed in U Hackworth, Digest of International Law, p.

567 et seq.
54 On this question see III Hackworth, Digest of Internal Law, p. 429 et seq.
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all cases in which the question of corporate nationality arises. The
other method is to classify the various problems involved, and then
to apply to each the rule which seems the most logical in application.
The United States has attempted to adopt the first method, applying
to all cases the rule originally evolved for the purpose of allowing corporations to get into the Federal courts under the diversity of citizenship requirement. The results of this course of action have been noted.
Whether the fault lies in the rule applied or in the single minded approach to the problem, the fact is that it does not work. England,
on the other hand, has adopted the second approach to the problem,
applying different rules to the different situations as they arise. An
examination of the decisions in the two countries has shown that the
English view, which is shared by the majority of nations, leads to results more in harmony with established economic, political, and even
legal aims. The criticism may be made that under the English rule
there is no standard, and that the tendency is for the matter to be
left entirely to the discretion of the judge, the result being that status
of the corporation is unpredictable and depends upon judicial whim.
This is the standard criticism of pragmatic law, and is a sound one.
There must be a balance between the fluidity of judicial discretion
and the rigidity of a rule of law. The problem has been argued before,
and will arise again.
John H. Merryman.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

TRANSPORTATION

OF PAROCHIAL

SCHOOL

PuPILs.-A problem of comparatively recent origin has arisen from an
issue as old as the nation. The problem is whether or not the state may
provide transportation for the students of private and parochial schools.
The issue, upon which many of the solutions have been based, is that
of public aid to sectarian institutions. The mere stating of the question connotes its importance from the viewpoints of constitutional law,
the welfare of the children affected, and that philosophical attitude of
the people which determines public policy. Consequently a brief
glimpse of the various opinions, legislation, and adjudication on the
point is not without merit.
For purposes of orientation it is advisable to note the American legal
position with regard to religion. The first act of lasting legal significance by the colonies acting in unison was the issuing of the Declaration of.Independence. In this keystone document they predicated their
act of separation upon all men's "unalienable rights" with which they
are "endowed by their Creator." The sole reason given for government was "for the protection of these rights." Thus, from the beginning these states were dedicated to the implementation of nature's law,
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which is the law of nature's Creator, with "a firm reliance on Divine
Providence." Just thirteen years later, at his first inauguration, George
Washington said,
"It would be peculiarly improper to omit, in this official act,
my fervent supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over
the universe, who presides in the councils of nations, and whose
providential aid can supply every human defect, that His benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happiness of the people
of the United States. .. ."
The true significance of this dedication lies in that it typifies the
opinions of the political leaders of the time. Those who subscribed to
the Declaration and those who framed the federal Constitution instituted a governmental system unique to the history of man in that
it was based upon a recognition of the God-given and consequently
inviolable character of man's rights. Of the original thirteen state constitutions, the federal constitution 1 and the thirty-five later state constitutions none omit a reference, either direct or indirect, to the religious
influence in all human affairs and its necessity to the well-being of
society. 2 And the expression of a reliance on God is not a practice of
historical lore, only, the youngest state, Arizona, 3 in the preamble to its
constitution wrote "We, the people of Arizona, grateful to Almighty
God....
As a consequence of their none too savory experience with state
churches of Europe the Americans developed a system which would
simultaneously protect the freedom of religious practice and guarantee
a separation of the church from the state. A representative state constitutional provision for the assurance of the first goalj as included in
the Bills of Rights, is that "no person shall be deprived of any of his
rights, privileges or capacities * * * in consequence of his opinions on
the subject of religion." 4 The second goal was provided for when
it was decided 5 that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Thus it
was assured that the government could neither destroy or attack the
churches by direct opposition (as recently in Germany), nor by subvention turn them to its own aims (as currently in Russia). This is
the American legal position on religion. As has been said," although
church and state, as such, are separate, "we are judicially, and seem
in fact committed to the propositions that Christianity is a part of
1
2

3

U. S. Constitution, Ist Amendment.
12 Marq. L. Rev. 206.

Arizona, admitted Feb. 14, 1912.
Iowa Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 4.
5 U. S. Constitution, 1st Amendment.
6 12 Marq. L. Rev. 206.
4
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the law of the land and that Christian ideals and conduct are the necessary predicate of a democratic government."
Upon this foundation of law regarding religion the vast majority of
the people agree. Most of the state constitutions have specific prohibitions upon the granting of money or aid to churches or institutions
thereof. Since certain of the religions in this country, notably Catholic,
Lutheran, and Episcopalian, maintain denominational or parish schools,
there is a controversy as to just what constitutes public aid to these
schools. These parochial schools are erected, maintained, and operated
at the expense of the parishioners so that their children may be taught
the principles of their particular faith. These people are not relieved
of the tax for the public schools. With the advent of automobiles and
buses transportation has become at once a boon and a threat to the
child in rural areas who must travel some distance to school. Public
school authorities met the problem, in most districts, with a system of
school buses. Private and parochial school authorities, with their
limited funds, were in large measure stymied. In many instances the
pupils of the parochial establishments began to ride the buses provided
by the school district. This and similar attempted solutions gave rise
to governmental action, principally judicial and legislative, turning on
the right of the school boards to allow the use of public funds by those
attending a non-public school. It is suggested by some that such a
practice is an aid to these parochial schools which conflicts with our
constitutional provisions prohibiting governmental aid to churches and
thus endangers our concept of the separation of church and state.
There is a split of authority on this question. The question has
usually been posed in the form of a challenge to the constitutionality
of statutes granting state aid to the school children of these schools for
transportation. In cases where it has been upheld as an exercise of
the state's police power in providing for the health, safety and convenience of the children affected, it has been observed that the incidental benefit to the private institution is immaterial, the prime benefactors being the children. 7 In that most of the states have compulsory
education statutes, it has been held that appropriations for the pupils'
transportation, even to parochial schools, is merely "an aid to children
in their compliance with the compulsory law." 8 In its broad aspect
the question of what constitutes illegal "aid" to sectarian institutions one
must consider state appropriations to such institutions as hospitals and
orphanages many of which are operated by the Church. "In the normal
run of cases involving private corporations conducting public services,
the view taken is that the appropriation was not made for the agency
itself but for the object which it serves, and that it is proper for the
legislature to employ a private agent to perform its duties where it does
7
8

Board of Education of Baltimore County v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314 (1938).
16 N. Y. L. Q. R. 143.
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not possess facilities of its own for doing so." 9 This description of
the attitude toward such projects, when applied to schools, immediately
suggests the query of whether the school district has adequate facilities
to properly teach all the children. In many localities the answer rs
obviously "no." But this, while perhaps provocative of further investigation, is off the point. The discussion by those upholding the
right of private school pupils to public transportation centers on what
has been called the "child benefit" theory. In practice this is, as the
Attorney General of New Hampshire said, regarding the constitutionality of a proposed amendment (later passed) to the state's education code, 10 "the constitutional limitation * * * relates to aid to
such schools and institutions as distinguished from the pupils thereof
and does not in any way prohibit aid to a pupil getting to and from
school." He added, "the institution must be considered as aided only
incidentally." This rule, established in Board of Education v. Wheat,"
in 1938, was upheld"12 in Maryland in 1942 and in Kentucky 13 in
1946.
In support of this rule a California statute 14 allows students of
parochial schools, who are entitled to attend public schools, to use the
transportation provided on the same terms as the other pupils. The
courts upheld the constitutionality of this legislation 1 as a proper exercise of police powers only indirectly beneficial to the school attended
by the children. Illinois has a similar statutory provision, 16 as do
Indiana 17 and Kansas. 18 Oregon allows such transportation by statute
authorization.'"
In Washington in 1943 a statute authorizing the
transportation was declared void,2 0 whereupon a new statute 21 was
passed to the same end. Its constitutionality is pendente lite. A
Wyoming opinion of the Attorney General agreed with the Illinois
rule. In Massachusetts a similar statute 22 was declared constitutional by the Attorney General. The Minnesota Attorney General's
opinion upheld the statute 23 as constitutional, "if the school district
9 Board of Education of Baltimore County v. Wheat, 174 Md. 317 (1938),
cited supra Note 7.
10 REvisED LAWS or NEw HAmPSHImE, Ch. 135, Sec. 9 (1942).
11 16 N. Y. L. Q. R. 143, cited sup'a Note 8.
12 Adams v. St. Marys County, 26 A (2d) 377 (1942).
13 Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 655, 191 S. W. (2d) 930 (1946) upholding
K. R. S.158, 115 Ch. 156 of 1944 Acts of G. A.
14 CAI.IF. EDUCATION CODE, Sec. 16.624.
15 Bowitzer v. Baker, 167 P. (2d) 256 (1946).
16
17

SCHOOL CODE or ILLINOIs, Ch. 122, Sec. 29-7 (1946).
BURNs IND. STATUTES, Sec. 28-2805 (1933).

18

SUPPLEMENT TO GENERAL STATUTES, Sec. 72-606 (1943).

19

SCHOOL CODE, OREGON CoMPmE

LAws ANN, Sec. 111-874.

20 Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201, 135 P. (2d) 79 (1943).
21 Ch. 28, Sec. 13, LAWS or 1933, as amended by Ch. 77, Sec. 1, LAWS or 1943.
22 Ch. 390, Statutes 1936.
23 Minn. Statutes, Sec. 2861 (1937).
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expends no funds thereon." A New Jersey statute allowing such transportation was held to conform to the constitution by the highest state
court but is now on the docket of the Federal Supreme Court on an
appeal involving the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The question also involves another point that is present in
much of the litigation, namely the right of taxation for what is alleged,
by one of the parties to the action, to be "private purposes" instead of
"public purposes." The adjudication of this case may do much in the
solution of this problem.
In 1938 the highest New York Court held a statute extending aid
to private and parochial school students to be unconstitutional, in the
much quoted case of Judd v. Board of Education,2 5 whereupon the constitution of the state was amended 26 to specifically provide for the
free school bus transportation of parochial school children. This cue
to a solution was taken by Wisconsin which in November of 1946
voted on an amendment to change their constitution. The result was
against the amendment in Wisconsin. This vote for a constitutional
amendment became necessary after the state's statute to provide such
transportation was held 27 in 1923 to be repugnant to the constitution. In the interim a new statute has been passed and held constitutional by a Circuit Court. It is being tested now before the Supreme Court of the State. Wyoming has likewise provided transportation for all of its school children, the Attorney General ruling 28 that
non-public school pupils may be transported if the bus is not filled.
On a parallel problem of similar principles, the providing of free
text books to the students of parochial schools, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held 29 such use of state tax money was constitutional in
that there was a public purpose served in lending books to the pupils
for their personal use. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
the United States so where the decision was affirmed. In the majority
opinion Chief Justice Hughes subscribed to the "child benefit" theory
quoting the Louisiana court,
"One may scan the acts in vain to ascertain where any money
is appropriated for the purchase of school books for the use of
any church, private, sectarian or even public school. The ap24 "School Bus Transportation Laws in the United States" by National Catholic Welfare Conference, Legal Dept., p. 144.
15 N. E. (2d) 675 (1938).
25
26 N. Y. Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 4.
27
State ex rel VanStraten v. Milquet, 192 N. W. 392 (1923).
28 "School Bus Transportation Laws in the United States" by National Catholic Welfare Conference, Legal Dept., p. 257.
29 Borden et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So.
655 (1929).
3o Cochrane et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 74 L. ed. 913, 281
U. S. 370 (1930).
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propriations were made for the specific purpose of purchaslng
school books for the use of the school children of the state, free
of cost to them * * * The school children.and the state alone are
the beneficiaries."
On the basis of this, the Chief Justice of the United States wrote,
"Viewing the statute as having the effect thus attributed to it,
we cannot doubt that the taxing power of the state is exerted
for a public purpose. The legislation does not segregate private
schools or their pupils, as its beneficiaries, or attempt to interfere
with any matters of exclusively private concern. Its interest is
education, broadly; its method, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the common interests are safe-guarded."
Iowa currently affords a good example of the importance of an early
solution of this problem. In Iowa the question of the constitutionality
of allowing transportation of parochial school children at public expense has been presented to the office of the Attorney General on five
occasions. Four of the opinions sustained the "school aid" theory and
one the "child benefit" theory. Although the state Supreme Court has
never ruled on the question, the District Court, in 1946, dismissed an
action s' by a consolidated school district which sought a declaratory
judgment determining its legal rights and duties, relative to the transportation of children who lived within the district and attended a parochial school, and its right to be reimbursed by the state. Upon its
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, the court
followed the "school .aid" theory. The opposite opinion 32 has been
made that "when you ride downtown to see a movie or a ball game the
theatre or the baseball corporation does not receive a single cent of
what you pay to go from your home to the movie house or the stadium."
Thus, some conclude, the individual child and not the school gets the
benefit of the free bus ride. Feelings as a result of the court's action
were so aroused that, to avoid violence, -theparochial school at Mallard,
Iowa, was closed by its director. The effect of the consequence of the
"school aid" theory was that eighty-four students transferred to the
public schools in this area. Since the average per pupil cost of schooling in Iowa is $104.74, the district tax burden was at once upped by
$8,798.16.33 This case is now on the docket of the Supreme Court of
Iowa. The necessity of an early and equitable adjustment of this
problem is readily apparent.
The Iowa situation is typical of many. The majority of the Appellate Courts that have ruled on this question have held that such
public transportation is an aid to a sectarian institution and thus is
Opinion of Dist. Ct. of Palo Alto County, Equity No. 15631, p. 32.
"Comment," Catholic Messenger, Rev. L: M. Boyle.
33 "Comment," Catholic Messenger, Rev. L. M. Boyle, cited supra Note 32.
31

32
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not to be allowed. The Delaware court held 34 that such a statute 35
to provide transportation is repugnant to the state constitution. In
Idaho, although the judiciary has never considered the question, the
opinion 36 of the Attorney General was that such legislation is not constitutional. South Dakota has held in court 37 that such aid to these
school children is not provided for by the educational statutes. In
Missouri the Attorney General has ruled that such transportation is
permissible but a statute is being considered by the Congress which
would deprive children in parochial schools of the right to ride the free
buses. 88 In Montana the children may ride on the "free" bus only if
they pay their fare. 39 In the instance of Gurnsey v. Ferguson in
1941,40 .the Oklahoma Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a
statute 41 which made parochial students "entitled .equally to the same
rights, benefits, and privileges as to transportation * * * ."
Many of the states, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia, as well as the District of Columbia,
have no judicial decisions on the point here discussed. The question
is pendente lite in Texas.
The position of those jurisdictions denying the school bus to parochial school students is that it is of benefit to the school rather than
to the children. It is contended that free transportation will induce
attendance at a school and enlarge its enrollment, bettering its fortune.
Where, they ask, is the line to be drawn; will not the providing of
transportation lead to the providing of free text books, teachers and
other accommodations? Another point of discussion which has apparently been controlling in many states is the interpretation of the
phrase "public purpose." Since public funds are acquired largely by
taxation of the public, the law is settled that they must be employed
exclusively for a public purpose. To use them otherwise is a perversion of the government's taxing power constituting a taking of
private property without due process of law, which is, of course,
repugnant to the Federal 42 as well as the State constitutions. If it
is not shown that transporting these children is a public purpose then
it appears to be a naked subsidy to someone, perhaps the school. Just
34

State ex tel. Taub et al. v. Brown et al., 36 Del. 181 (1934).

35

LAWS op DL. wARE,Ch.

142, Sec. 3, of Vol. 38.

"School Bus Transportation Laws in the United States" by National Catholic Welfare Conference, Legal Dept., p. 41.
36
37

Schiltz v. Picton, 282 N. W. 519 (1938).

"School Bus Transportation Laws in the United States," by National Catholic Welfare Conference, Legal Dept., p. 158.
38

LAW or 1941, Ch. 152, Sec. 8.
40 122 P. (2d) 1002 (1941).
41 Artide H, Ch. 34, S.L. (1939).
39
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what constitutes public purpose is not easy of definition, but that
Government can tax only' for a public purpose is well settled. In fact,
"It was to curb governmental expenditures that the doctrine of public
purpose was first used in the state courts." 4 Therefore, the courts
construe the term strictly. The strict rule also reflects the courts' insistence that the states maintain nonsectarian schools. Despite these
arguments, the fact that highways are extremely dangerous, particularly
for children, induces many jurists to reason that an effort by the state
to protect all children is a valid exercise of the police powers. In actual practice at least sixteen states provide transportation for parochial
school pupils. 44 Others find a contradiction in the rulings on "public
purpose" on the one hand, and the rulings, on the other, that a parent
may send his. child to a parochial school, 45 that it is a proper legislative
act to tax for school buses 4 6 and that the helping of these parochial
school pupils is not contrary to the constitution, 41 particularly when the
state courts which made the former rulings and the United States Supreme Court, -which made the latter, are presumably governed by
essentially the same basic law.
Apparently the admirable alertness of the judiciary to the necessity
of maintaining church and state each unfettered by the other had been
the basis for many of the rulings. But that a union of church and
state is either sought or desired by any person or group of importance
is difficult to believe. It is the Catholics of the United States who are
most widely affected by the present "bus rules." Regarding the position of the Church on the relations of church and state, one of her
spokesmen, Cardinal Gibbons explained: 48
"The separation of church and state in this country seems to
Catholics the natural, the inevitable, and the best conceivable
plan, the one that would work best among us, both for the good
of religion and of the state. * * * American Catholics rejoice in
our separation of church and state, and I can conceive no combination of circumstances likely to arise which should make a
union desirable either to church or state."
The transportation of private and parochial school children by the
state is only one of the phases of what, in every sense, is an educational
problem in this country. But it is a typical example of the question
18 Col. L. Rev. 137.
Argument of W. H. Speer, before Supreme Court of the United States, 20
Nov., 1946.
45 Governor of Maryland v. Hill Military Academy, 268 U. S.510, 69 L. ed.
1070, 45 S. Ct. 571, 39 A. L. R. 468 (1925).
46 Cochrane v. Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370, 74 L. ed. 913, 50 S. Ct.
335, (1930) cited supra Note 30.
47 Borden et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123
So. 655 (1929) cited supra Note 29.
48
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of how to provide the best education to all the children. At the moment
the problem is in the hands of the individual states. But their handling
of it, if not satisfactory, will inevitably lead to an attempted assumption of the question by the federal government. As an example of
the inequities of the situation as it existed just ten years ago, one of
the states was spending exactly thirty-two (32c) cents per negro child
for every one hundred ($100) dollars per white.4 9 Progress has been
slow. That those who prepare our children for life's work are inadequately compensated, in many states, is notorious. If these infamous
inequities are not remedied some extra-local means will be employed,
this means federal aid - which implies a measure of federal control for education. At least one bill 50 to that end is now in Senate committee. Federal aid, to even sectarian schools, is by no means unprecedented. It dates back to the Ordinance for the Government of
the Northwest Territory, adopted by the Continental Congress, which
made Lot 16 of each township available for schools and Lot 29 available for "purpose of religion," observing that "religion, morality and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged." 51 Today federal aid is accomplishing great things under
the G. I. Bill of Rights, aiding students, many of them in attendance
at denominational institutions.
This, then, is the problem, one of vital importance to oui society.
To solve it sage tolerance will be required. To ignore it is negligent
indifference to our best interest.
John E. Cosgrove and Edward J. Flattery.

LABOR LAW - USE OF THE INJUNCTION WITH REFERENCE TO LABOR
UNIONS.-A general discussion of the use of the injunction with re-

ference to labor disputes, the right to injunctive relief in labor disputes,
the acts enjoinable, and the practice and procedure in a suit for such
relief will here be considered. In cases involving labor disputes, the
injunction did not secure recognition as a possible remedy until 1888 1
even though resort to an injunction haqbeen made as early as 1868.2
49

"Opportunity of Education for All" by American Federation of Labor

(1945).

50 Report of Executive Council of A. F. of L. to the 65th Convention, 7 Oct.,
1946; S. 717, H. R. 3002.
51 "Opportunity for Education for All" by American Federation of Labor
(1945).
1

Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888).

See opinion of Brandeis, J. dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312,
66 L. ed. 254 (1920).
2
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The past half-century has seen an ever-increasing use of the injunction in cases of contest between employer and employee, and it
now seems settled that, except as otherwise provided by statute, such
injunction is the appropriate remedy for unjustifiable interference in
one's business by acts done in pursuance of a labor dispute, where irreparable injury is likely to ensue and a continuance of the unlawful interference is threatened. 3 The inadequacy of the legal remedy and
the prevention of a multiplicity of suits are the principal grounds upon
which equitable jurisdiction is assumed even though Federal courts
have, in some instances, caused injunctions to be issued on the ground
that the acts enjoined amount to an interference with interstate
commerce.

4

Power of the court to punish a violation of an injunction by fine
or imprisonment renders an injunction an effective remedy in labor
disputes. 5 The basis for such-injunctions against labor unions is that
the right to carry on a lawful business without obstruction is a property
right and its protection is the proper object for the granting of an
injunction.6 Since property rights are involved it is not an obstacle
to injunctive relief that the acts to be restrained are of a criminal nature, and that to punish them as contempts amounts to an assumption of criminal jurisdiction without the intervention of a jury.7
The substantive rights of the parties involved in a Federal action
for an injunction with reference to a labor dispute are governed by
the law of the state in which the acts complained of occurred.8 The
power of the Federal court to grant relief, however, depends upon the
jurisdiction conferred upon the court by the statutes of the United
States.9 Because of this distinction, the question as to what constitutes
a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the state statute, the interpretation of the state supreme court should be binding upon the Federal
courts.

It is generally agreed that the right to carry on a lawful business
without obstruction is a property right which the courts will protect
by means of an injunction in a proper case. This is also applied when
the employees are deprived of access to the employing market. In
3 Coeur d'Alene Consol. Min. Co. v. Miners' Union (C. C.) 51 F. 260, 19
L. R. A. 382 (1892); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97
(1919); Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896); Beck v. Railway Teamsters Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898).
4 Toledo A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., (C. C.) 54 F. 730, 19
L. R. A. 387 (1893).
5 Vitter Mfg. Co. v. Humphrey, 132 Wis. 587, 112 N. W. 1095 (1907).

6 St. Germain v. Bakery & C. Workers International Union, 97 Wash. 282,
166 P. 665 (1917).
7 State ex rel. Hopkins v. Howat, 109 Kan. 376, 198 P. 686 (1921).
8 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578 (1938).
9 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578 (1938).
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such an instance, it has been held that they are deprived of a property
right.10 An employer may seek and obtain an injunction against a
combination of laborers in violation of the Federal Anti-Trust Act even
though he may not at the time of bringing the suit have suffered actual injury. It is enough that an intent to restrain interstate commerce
be shown to justify an injunction on the ground that there is a dangerous probability that such injury will happen. 1
As we have seen, it is settled that the courts may enjoin acts or
words of striking employees or members of a labor union which will
operate to intimidate the customers of a person from dealing with or
laborers from working for him even though such acts may constitute
a violation of the criminal law. Persons may be prevented by injunction from attempting, by intimidation and threats of violence, to coerce
employees to leave their work and join a strike.' 2 In similar manner,
where former employees resort to force, coercion, or intimidation to
prevent others from taking their places, it is the duty of the courts to
13
interfere and to discontinue such abuses by means of an injunction.
It is a common use of the injunction to prevent strangers to a valid
contract for personal services from inducing a breach thereof. In accordance with this principle, an employer may procure an injunction
against the act of a union or its members in inducing employees to
serve for a definite time when attempts are made to have them break
these contracts. 14 A statute providing that an employment having no
specified term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice
to the other does not preclude the issuance of an injunction against
the inducement of employees to quit in violation of their contracts for
employment, even though such employment is terminable by either
party even upon seven days notice. 15 A labor union may be enjoined
from interfering with the performance of existing contracts by calling
a strike to force an employer to unionize his labor, and from placing
his name on a blacklist which will hamper him in securing the help
necessary to such performance. 16
Despite the numerous restrictions which may be placed upon labor
unions through use of the injunction, an injunction will not lie to prevent workingmen from combining and endeavoring to persuade other
employees to join them in order to secure a legitimate object, such as
an increase in wages, in the absence of acts amounting to intimidation
10

11

A. T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N. E. 82 (1927).
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Assoc., 274 U. S.

37, 47 S. Ct. 522 (1927).

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212, 32 S. W. 1106 (1895).
13 George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 77 N. J. Eq. 219,
79 A. 262 (1911).
14 Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316 (1911).
12
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84 A. L. R. 92.

16 W. A. Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116 N. E. 801 (1917).
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or the like. 17 Both Federal and state legislation have declared contracts with employees not to join unions to be unlawful and such agreements therefore do not have to be considered here. Injunctions do
not lie to prevent members of a labor union from striking to advance
their own interests, although they thereby inflict injury upon the business of an employer of nonunion labor, and they contemplate and intend such a possible effect. 18 A court may, however, enjoin union employees of one company having no controversy with their employers
from striking or threatening to strike as a means of compelling their
employers to injure another. employer of non-union labor. 19
The general rules governing injunctive relief preclude the use of the
injunction in order to prevent a breach of contract for services. Thus
in the case of cessation of work by employees who are under contract,
a court of equity will not restrain the violation of the contract and
compel the affirmative performance of services. A different rule obtains in the case of a combination or conspiracy to procure an employee or body of employees to quit service in violation of a contract
of service; for in that case, injunctive relief may be had if the threatened injury would be irremediable at law as we have already noticed.
Most frequent application of the injunction in labor disputes has
come in the past with reference to the picketing by the employees or
members of the labor union of the employer who cannot otherwise be
persuaded to comply with their demands. Courts upholding the right
to picket will not grant an injunction against the use of peaceful persuasion to prevent persons from working for or patronizing the employer, but they will not hesitate to interfere where the acts or spoken
words are intimidative or tend to coerce compliance with their request.20 To grant an injunction in such cases would not violate the
constitutional guarantees of free speech, free press, and the right of
peaceable assembly.
Striking employees cannot be enjoined from using persuasion to prevent other workmen from taking their places, or to induce those who
have done so without making a definite contract to quit work, unless
the strike itself is illegal, so as to authorize relief against any acts in
2
the furtherance thereof. '
While there have, in some cases, been injunctions granted against
the display of bannering a place of business, such is not generally the
case save in instances where such is done by third persons not having
5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1097.
Is Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers, M. & P. Local Union, 92 Conn.
161, 101 A. 659 (1917).
19 International Brotherhood, E. W. v. Western U. Teleg. Co., (C. C. A. 7th),
6 F. (2d) 444, 46 A. L. R. 1538 (1925).
20 Jones v. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E. 236 (1908).
21 Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940 (1908).
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an industrial dispute with the owner of the business. No injunction
can be granted under statutes generally against the peaceable display22
ing of placards.
It was only when the use of the injunction became extensive and
conspicuous, that there arose storms of protest against it and statutes
were enacted to restrict the practice. Chief among the acts passed by
legislative bodies are the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act
which were enacted by the Congress of the United States and which
govern disputes in federal jurisdictions. A number of similar statutes
based in whole or in part upon these parent enactments have been
passed by the legislatures of the several states and made into law. A
more detailed discussion of these two important federal pieces of legislation governing labor and the use of the injunction will now be considered.
THiE CLAYTON AcT.-As we have seen, the history and development
of the labor injunction has been attended by great confusion and conflict. Rather than an alleviation, Congress has produced a burden, not
only upon the labor unions, but upon the judiciary, whose task is to
infer a legislative intent from the various enactments.
The Clayton Act (29 USCA No. 52) was the most important piece
of labor legislation since the Sherman Act of 1890. This became law
by President Wilson's signature on October 15, 1914. Congress relied
mainly upon the idea to curb what it and others considered the enthusiasm for judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act with regard to
injunctive relief concerning labor situations. Thus Section 6 reads
in part: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce . . ." The passage of the law was the result of an intensive campaign begun shortly after the decision handed down in the
case of Loewe v. Lawlor.2 3 This campaign had two main purposes:
(1) the abolition of such ambiguous and equivocal terms regarding
labor rights; and, (2) legislation relieving labor combinations from the
application of the anti-trust laws. At the time it was popularly supposed that the act was the perfect answer to both demands.
The newly-made law was welcomed most heartily by organized
labor, especially because Section 20 (this is the section which deals
with injunctive relief) specifically pointed out what activities were
to be characterized by such word-definitions as "lawfully" and "peacefully," and as such, were declared not to be in in violation of any
federal law. Samuel Gompers cheerfully described it the "Industrial
Magna Charta."
However the Clayton Act proved to be the keenest disappointment
ever suffered by organized labor. Instead of mitigating attacks upon
22 Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers International Union, 358 Il. 239, 193 N. E.
112 (1934).
23 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301 (1908).
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the activities of labor unions and minimizing the use of injunctions in
labor disputes, it led to more assaults than had occurred before its
passage. Section 6 was judicially construed to exempt labor combinations from the anti-trust laws only in cases where its activities
were deemed to constitute an incidental restraint upon interstate
trade. 24 Where the court believed that the combinations were primarily intended to restrain such trade, their activities were held to
be unlawful. 25 Obviously, then, the Clayton Act was not deemed to
have legalized such collective labor action which the court otherwise
had regarded as unlawful.2 6
In one respect the position of organized labor was more in jeopardy
after the passage of the Clayton Act than before. Prior to 1914 only
the federal government could obtain an injunction against alleged violations of the Sherman Act; whereas after the passage, any private person injured by any restraint of interstate trade might maintain an
injunction proceeding against the wrongdoer, in accordance with Sec27
tion 16 of the Clayton Act.

From the passage of the Clayton Act until the first adjudication of
it by the Supreme Court in 1921,28 at least thirteen cases were considered in which Section 20 was applied. 29 In most of these cases the
statute was not considered to be a bar to an injunction. One court
30
To refuse to work
held that it did not change the preexisting law.
upon non-union construction was deemed a strike "for a whim," and
therefore such a strike was enjoinable.81 Thus we see that the hos24 United Leather Workers International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk
Co., 265 U. S. 457, 44 S. Ct. 623 (1924); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
& Coke Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570 (1922).
25 Coronado Coal & Coke Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 S.
Ct. 551 (1925).
26 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.
184, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921).
27 Rotwein on LABoR, p. 70.
28 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921).
29 Injunction Granted: Alaska Steamship Co. v. International Longshoremen's
Association, 236 F. 964 (1916); Tri-City Central Trades Council v. American Steel
Foundries, 238 F. 728 (1916) (modified later on appeal, op. cit.); Stephens v. Ohio
State Telephone Co., 240 F. 759 (1917); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Retail
Clerks' International Protective Association, 250 F. 890 (1918); Montgomery v.
Pacific Electric Railway Co., 258 F. 382 (1919); Dal-Overland Co. v. WillysOverland Co., 263 F. 171 (1920); Langenberg Hat Co. v. United Cloth Hat and
Cap Makers of North America, 266 F. 127 (1920); Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co. v.
United Leather Workers International Union, 268 F. 662 (1920) (reversed later
on appeal, op. cit.).
Injunction Denied: Puget Sound Traction Light & Power Co. v. Whitley, 243
F. 945 (1917); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 247 F. 192 (1917) (reversed
later on appeal, op. cit.); Kinloch Telephone Co. v. Local Union No. 2 of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 265 F. 312 (1920).
Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., 240 F. 759 (1917).
30
31 Vonnegut Machinery Co. v. Toledo Machine & Tool Co., 263 F. 192 (1920).
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tility toward picketing was too deeply ingrained in the minds of the
judges to permit of a more liberal interpretation of the Clayton Act.
In one case the court said; "Practical people question the possibility
of peaceful persuasion through the practice of picketing." 32
In the Duplex case 33 an injunction was sought to restrain the
unions concerned from interfering by inducing their members not to
work for the Duplex Company, or its customers, in connection with
the hauling, installation and repair of printing presses made by the
Company. There was a strike pending against the Company to secure
the closed shop, an eight-hour day, and a union scale of wages. After
a District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals both had ruled in favor
of the labor unions, the case came before the highest court in the
land in 1921. In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed
the dismissal of the bill, concluding that the instigation of a strike
against an employer who was at peace with his own employees, solely
to compel such employer to withdraw his business from the plaintiff
(with whom the unions were disputing) can in no wise be considered
a persuasive activity lawfully and peacefully according to the definitions set out in Section 20 of the Clayton Act. Thus, whatever vestige
or labor protection which was apparently in the Clayton Act disappeared completely after the decision in the Duplex case. In short, the
Clayton Act did not legalize labor actions which before its inception
were illegal. More federal injunctions were issued after its passage than
before. Therefore it failed to serve the purpose for which it was evidently enacted, and the enthusiasm with which it was greeted by organized labor was grounded upon hopes and assumptions.
NORm~s-LAGUARDiA ANTI-INJuNCTION AcT.-Labor, as well as
other persons or industries, had learned the actual operation of an act
depends on its construction by the Courts. Dissatisfaction with the
limited effect given Section 20 of the Clayton Act by the Courts resulted in the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act
of 1932, which prohibits the issuance of injunctions in Federal Courts
in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes, as therein defined,
except in strict accord with its provisions.
The purpose of this Act was very aptly described in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court in New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 34 in which he said: "The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that it was the purpose of the
Congress further to extend the prohibitions of the Clayton Act respecting the exercise of jurisdiction by Federal Courts and to obviate the
results of the judicial construction of that Act. It was intended that
peaceful and orderly dissemination of information by those defined as
32

Ibid.

33
34

Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, op. cit.
New Negro v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 58 S. Ct. 703, p. 707 (1938).
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persons interested in a labor dispute concerning terms and conditions
of employment in an industry or a plant or a place of business should
be lawful; that, short of fraud, breach of the peace, violence or conduct
otherwise unlawful, those having a direct or indirect interest in such
terms of employment should be at liberty to advertise and disseminate
facts and information with respect to terms and conditions of employment, and peacefully persuade others to concur in their views respecting an employer's practices."
The important sections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act with reference
to the injunction affecting unions and their activities will be discussed.
Section 4 of the Act very definitely limits and deprives the Courts
of the United States of jurisdiction to issue restraining orders, either
temporary or permanent, in cases involving or growing out of a labor
dispute, preventing the acts therein enumerated. Section 4 of the
Act reads as follows:
No Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to reiain in
any relation of the employment.
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer organization, regardless of any such
undertaking or promise as is described in Section 3 of this
Act.
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or
unemployment benefits or insurance, or other things of value.
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against
in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of the
United States or of any State.
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in,
any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any other method not involving fraud or
violence.
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to. action promotion of their interests in a labor dispute.
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any
of the acts heretofore specified.
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the
acts heretofore specified.
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(i) Advising, urging or otherwise causing or inducing without
fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of
any such undertaking or promise as is described in Section 3
of this Act.
Section 13 of the Act defines a labor dispute and who is interested
or involved in a labor dispute in the following language:
When used in this Act, and for the purposes of this Act ...
(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the
same industry, trade, craft or occupation; or have direct or
indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same
employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated
organization of employers and employees; where such dispute
is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or associations of
employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; (3) between one or more employees or associations
of employees and one or more employees or association of
employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or
competing interests in labor disputes of "persons participating or interested" therein.
(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against
him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry,
trade, craft or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or
as a direct or indirect interest therein, as a member, officer,
or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of
employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade,
craft or occupation.
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, firing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.
Just what is a labor dispute has been clearly established by the
United States Supreme Court in the New Negro Alliance case 3 5
which stated that there can be a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the absence of relation of employer and employee, and even when the "petitioners are not engaged in any business competitive with that of the respondent and the
35 Supra.
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officers, members, or representatives of the petitioners are not engaged
in the same business or occupation as the respondent or its employees."
Therefore, it is not necessary for the workers or persons involved to
be in the same or competitive industry.
In the case of Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers Local Union,30
an injunction was sought to prevent picketing for the purposes of compelling the plaintiff to discharge a non-union sign writer. The Court
in holding that a labor dispute was involved sustained its position because it is a "controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment" and because it is a "controversy concerning the association of
persons in seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment." A
unionization campaign in an effort to unionize employees of a plant has
been held a labor dispute in L. L. Coryell & Son v. Petroleum Workers Union.37
Similarly, a strike for a closed shop is a labor dispute even though
none of .the employees of the employer are members of the striking
union. In the case of Lauf v. Shinner,3 8 the Supreme Court of the
United States held specifically that an employer's suit to enjoin picketing by a labor union and its members, which picketing was for the
purpose of cercing the employer to adopt the closed shop and accept
the union as a bargaining unit of its employees, involves a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, although none
of the employees were members of the union and although all of the
employees had actually refused to join the union.
Since the Courts have generally acknowledged the right of the employee to picket peacefully, the question arises as to what is peaceful
picketing and what is unlawful picketing. What is peaceful picketing
will depend upon the facts and circumstances in each case. Section
4(E) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act has a distinct relation to the acts of
pickets in that one of the acts of picketing and one of the main purposes of picketing is giving publicity in accordance with that section.
It would therefore seem that peaceful picketing, to begin with, must
be carried on without fraud or violence. In like manner, there must
also be an absence of intimidation and physical obstruction.
An interesting statement on the type of picketing that is unlawful
is found in the Goldfinger v. Feintuck case 39 in which the Court discussed the proposition in the following language:
"Picketing is not peaceful where a large crowd gathers in mass
formation or where there is shouting or the use of loud speakers
in front of a picketed place of business, or the sidewalk or en36

37
38
39

Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164 (1934).
L. L. Coryell & Son v. Petroleum Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 749 (1936).
Lauf v. Shinner, 58 S. Ct. 578 (1938).
Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937).
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trance is obstructed by parading around in a circle or lying on
the sidewalk. Such actions are illegal, and are merely a form of
intimidation . . . Nor is it legal to threaten to ruin the custom
or trade generally or to accost or interfere with customers at the
entrance to the store. Disorderly conduct, force, violence, or intimidation by pickets should be sternly suppressed by the police
and administrative authorities."
An important section of the Act relates to the liability of officers and
members of a Union for unlawful acts. It reads as follows:
"No officer or member of any association or organization and
no association or organization participating or interested in a
labor dispute shall be held responsible or liable in any court of
the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in,
or actual authorization of such acts, or of ratification of such acts
after actual knowledge thereof."
The section is intended to prevent responsibility being cast upon
the union for acts of persons where there is no clear proof that such
persons were authorized or that such acts were ratified by the union.
The words in the Norris-LaGuardia Act are not to be given a strained
and unnatural construction in conflict with its declared purpose. 40 The
act does not confer jurisdiction previously exercised in controversies
41
between employers and employees.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Procedural questions have formed the vortex of numerous and important storms concerning the use of injunctions with reference to labor
unions. If a union is incorporated, it may be a party to the suit in
its own name. However, in the case of an unincorporated union which
has a large membership, it is impracticable to bring all the members

before the court, therefore, a suit may be brought in the name of some
of the members suing in behalf of all, by the officers of the association,
42
or by a committee appointed or authorized to prosecute such suit.
The common law rule that a voluntary association is not a legal
entity and cannot be sued in its common name distinct from that of its
members has been applied to unincorporated labor unions. In an action at law against a labor union, the general rule, unless statute otherwise provides, is that every member of the union must be joined as a
party defendant, if objection is properly taken. The foregoing rules
have been held to be applicable in suits of equity. However, where the
41

Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 57 S. Ct. 592 (1937).
97 A. L. R. 1339.
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Carpenters Union v. Citizens Committee to Enforce the Landis Award, 333

40
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225, 164 N. E. 393 (1928).
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members of a labor organization are numerous, a suit in equity may
be instituted by simply joining as defendants a few members who, because of their position, may be deemed sufficient to represent and protect the interests of the entire membership, proper allegations being
made in the bill that such persons are made defendants as representing
43
all others of the same class - that is, as standing for the union.
Federal procedure differs however in that the Supreme Court of
the United States has included labor unions in that group of organizations which may sue or be sued as an organization. This conclusion
as to the suability of labor unions is confirmed by the words'of Sections
7 and 8 of the Anti-Trust Law. The persons who may be sued under
Section 7 include "corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of
the territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country." 44 This language is very broad, and the words, given their natural signification, certainly include labor unions. They are associations
existing under the laws of the United States, of the territories thereof,
and of the states of the Union. Congress was passing drastic legislation
to remedy a threatening danger to the public welfare, and did not
intend that any persons or combinations of persons should escape its
application. Their thought was especially directed against business
associations and combinations that were unincorporated to do the things
forbidden by the act, but they used language broad enough to include
all associations which might violate its provisions recognized by the
statutes of the United States or the states or the territories or foreign
countries as lawfully existing; and this, of course, includes labor
unions, as the legislation referred to shows. Thus unincorporated associations are made parties to suits in the Federal courts under the
Anti-Trust Act. 4 5

This opinion settled the question of actions being

taken against an unincorporated union, as such, in the Federal courts.
In effect it held that the development of labor unions and centralization
of power and property in one central body, with the right to absolutely
control even the individual organizers and officers of local unions, was
of such a corporate nature that public policy demanded that, having
acquired protection and benefits under the laws of the United States,
they should also be required under some circumstances to respond in
Federal courts.

40

An employer, of course may sue or be sued in the legal capacity of
the business concern of which he is a member for injunctive relief with
31 Am. Jur., Section 310.
July 2, (1890), 26 Stat. at L. 210, Chap. 647, Comp. Stat., Sec. 8830, 9 Fed.
Stat. Anno. (2 ed.) p. 726.
45 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U. S.
344, 66 L. ed. 975, 42 S. Ct. 570 (1924).
46 Bartling v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 40 F. Supp. 366 (1941).
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respect to labor disputes when striking employees or members of labor
unions exceed the permissible bounds to his injury.
An injunction may be granted against striking employees and also
against strangers participating in illegal acts of intimidation, threats,
and coercion directed at customers or employees of an employer. A
court may also enjoin such acts on the part of the members of a labor
union. However, an injunction will not lie against a union because of
threats made by individual members for which the union is not shown
to be responsible, whereas an injunction order may be directed against
the union which formed and maintained the picket line in order to
make a strike effective, although it did not consent to or acquiesce in
47
the unlawful acts of the pickets.
A complaint or bill for injunctive relief must state a cause of action,
in accordance with the general rules. It must not deal wholly in
generalities, presumptions, and conclusions, nor omit to state specific
overt acts. Likewise the injunction granted should not be broader
than is justified by the facts in the case; it should not restrain the
commission of acts not embraced within the averments of the complaint or bill. An injunctive order granted in a case involving a labor
dispute should specifically point out the offenses that properly come
within it. For example, an injunctive order against a strike should
describe distinctly what it intends to restrain.
While it has been held that an injunction against "boycotting," as
such, is too broad, picketing may be enjoined by the use of the specific
term because its meaning is clearly understood in the sphere of the
controversy by those who are parties to it. The decree, however, should
be couched in language sufficiently definite to inform the defendants
to what extent they may carry on picketing activities. The extent of
relief granted and the number of pickets which may be allowed are
to be governed by circumstances and rest in the discretion of the judge.
To enjoin picketing "in a threatening or intimidating manner" is inadequate because it leaves compliance largely to the discretion of the
picket. 48 The injunction granted in an action involving a labor dispute
may run to named parties and also to classes of persons through whom
they may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders, abettors, etc.;
even though they are not parties to the action. Thus an absolute
stranger to the action may be punished for contempt if he contravenes
the terms of the injunction, provided, of course, he had notice of the
injunction. However, the authorities differ on this question; there is
interpretation to the effect that a mere picket is not guilty of contempt
in violating an injunction when it does not appear that he was a party
to the action, was a member of the union, or had any connection with
47
48

31 Am. Jur., Sec. 380.
31 Am. Jur., Sec. 390.
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any of the enjoined parties, and this is true even though he may have
had actual notice of the injunction.
Also, of course, labor unions, themselves, may be punished for contempt in violating an injunction. They may be held to be guilty of
conspiracy after the issuance of the injunction, for the purpose of violating it, notwithstanding the statement of their officers that they ad40
vised the members of the union to be orderly and to obey the law.
Unquestionably labor leaders who direct the violation of an injunction
will be subject to punishment for contempt. 50
The Clayton Act is silent as to the venue in contempt proceedings
for the violation of an injunction granted, but leaves it as before; the
contempt, therefore may be punished in the division of a district in
which the order was passed, although disobedience occurs elsewhere. 51
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, provides that, in cases arising
thereunder, the person charged with contempt shall have a right to be
tried in the state and district in which the contempt shall have been
committed. Accordingly, contempt proceedings in a case within the
act must be tried in the district where the alleged contempt took
52
place.
In seeking an injunction in a labor dispute, however, jurisdiction
is not strictly construed. Where the alleged threatened damage exceeds the requisite jurisdictional amount, the court has jurisdiction of
a suit to restrain strikers from damaging or destroying the plaintiff's
property, and it is not necessary to the acquisition of jurisdiction that
property worth such amount should have been destroyed. When the
right for which protection is sought is the right to conduct one's business without unlawful interference and the value of such right, because of its intangible character, cannot be calculated in money, the
court will refuse to entertain jurisdiction. 58
James D. Sullivan, Lawrence Turner,
John O'Rorke, Thomas Broden.

31 Am. Jur., Sec. 395.
General Electric Co. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of
America, 67 N. E. (2d) 802 (1946).
51 Myers v. United States, 26 U. S. 95, 69 L. ed. 577, 44 S. Ct. 272 (1924).
52 31 Am. Jur., Sec. 401.
53 31 Am. Jur., Sec. 374.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -

SUNSTROKE AS A COMPENSABLE

IN-

juR.-There has been considerable controversy as to whether the
several compensation acts should be held to contemplate injuries caused
by excessive heat, cold, or other meteorological phenomena.'
This
survey will concern itself primarily with those cases arising as a result of injury or death caused by excessive heat. The words "sunstroke" and "heatstroke," as used in this treatise, are synonymous and
mean a sudden prostration resulting from exposure to such excessive
heat, regardless of the source from which the heat emanates.2 Heatstroke or sunstroke is regarded by both medical authorities and the
courts as a serious and frequently disastrous condition, often resulting in death or disability and when proven is held by a majority of the
courts to be compensable.3
The usual phraseology of the compensation acts provides for an
award of compensation for "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." 4 Not infrequently,
the wording of the statute is varied, but the general purport is the
same. This clause has given rise to many and varied interpretations,
and opinions under the statute have, if such a thing were possible, intensified the common law maze of apparently conflicting and often unintelligible statements, observations and reasonings. 5 The Massachusetts court comes closest to giving a comprehensive definition of
said clause in the McNicol's case, where it is said that the injury, in
order to warrant a payment of compensation,
".... must both arise out of and also be received in the course
of employment . . . Neither alone is enough . . . An injury is

received 'in the course of' the employment when it comes while
the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform.
It 'arises out of' the employment when there is ... a causal con-

nection between the conditions under which the work is required
to be performed and the resulting injury ... If the injury
seen . . . to have been contemplated by a reasonable
familiar with the whole situation . . . then it arises 'out
employment . . .The causative danger must be peculiar

can be
person
of' the
to the

work, and not common to the neighborhood ...It need not haye
1 L. R. A. 1918F 936.
2 Mather v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 125 Minn. 186, 145 N. W.
963 (1914).

3 Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Adams, 70 Ga. App. 297, 28 S. E. (2d) 79
(1943); Malone v. Industrial Comm., 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N. E. (2d) 266 (1942);
Douglas v. Riggs Disler Co., 122 N. J. L. 379, 5 A. (2d) 873 (1939); Oklahoma
Gas & Electric Co. v. Maloney, 184 Okla. 465, 88 P. (2d) 363 (1939).
4 JoNzs ILL. STAT. ANN., Sec. 143.17 (1936); BURNS IND. STAT. ANN., Sec.
40-1202 (1933); MicH. STATs. ANN., Sec. 17.151 (1937); THomsoN's LAWS OF
Nxw Yoax, Chap. 67, Art. 1, Sec. 2 (1939); PuRDoN's PENN. STATS., Tit. 77, .Sec.
411 (1936).
5 28 R. C. L., Workmen's Compensation Acts, Sec. 88.
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been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to
have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and
to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence." 6
In the recent Indiana case of L. W. Dailey Construction Co. v.
Carpenter,7 the Appellate Court sustained a ruling of the Industrial
Commission awarding compensation to the wife of the decedent, who
suffered heatstroke while engaged in pouring and leveling concrete in
forms in the construction of gutters and curbs. The court was especially liberal in its interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation
Act as respects cases arising from sunstroke. The court sustained
three important propositions which will be discussed in relationship
to attitudes taken by courts in other states and in England. The first
of these is the "exposure beyond that of the general public" rule,
the second is the "fellow-worker exposure" rule, and third is sunstroke
classified as either an accident or an occupational disease.
In the earlier Indiana case of Townsend and Freeman Co. v.
Taggart,8 the court took judicial notice that on a hot day, when the
sun is shining brightly, it is warmer on a gravel roadway than surrounding country, and that a rider of one horse of a four-horse team
would receive heat from the horse he was riding and, too, from the
other horses. It was held that at the time the rider received the sunstroke he was exposed to a hazard beyond that of the general public,
and that his disability, which resulted therefrom (sunstroke), was due
to an accident arising out of his employment. The test, manifestly
relied on by the court, was whether the employee was subject to a
greater hazard than that to which the general public would have been
exposed. 9
The appellant (L. W. Dailey Construction Co.), in the principal
case, seems entirely justified in examining and basing his case on the
circumstances that surround the employee's death by sunstroke in the
light of past decisions rendered by Indiana and other state courts on
cases similar on the facts presented. Appellant cites a case involving
an employee of a cemetery association whose death from sunstroke
was held not compensable on the grounds that although the day was
hot and humid, there was nothing arising from the work in which he
was employed to increase the danger of heatstroke above that which
was sustained by his fellow workers or the people living in the same
immediate area.10 The lawn mower which he used could not be compared with any implement that produced an appreciable amount of
0 In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1916).
7
8

114 Ind. App. 522, 153 N. E. (2d) 190 (1944).
81 Ind. App. 610, 144 N. E. 556 (1924).

9 Ibid.
10 Thompson v. Masonic Cemetery Association, 103 Ind. App. 74, 5 N. E.

(2d) 145 (1936).
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artificial heat, as cited in another interesting case."' In the case under
discussion, we find a similar situation in which the tool used by the
deceased, Carpenter, is a wooden handled spade which could not contribute any artificial heat to that produced by the sun's rays. The
point on which the case seems to turn and which has apparently influenced the court's decision is brought out in the leading Minnesota
case of State ex rel. Rau v. District Court Ramsey Co.12 The conditions surrounding the decedent, Rau, at the time of his injury exposed
him to the direct rays of the sun, in addition to the humid atmosphere
emanating from the wet, sandy street. The test applied by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in this case was succinctly stated, thus:
"Was decedent exposed to something more than the normal
risk to which men in general engaged in manual labor on the
streets are subject in hot weather? If he was, then he was
exposed to an extra danger arising out of his employment, and
if that contributed to the accident, then the accident arose out
of the employment."
Carpenter was working along an oil surfaced roadway and combined
with the water used in wetting down the cement curbing, these factors seem to have contributed the necessary artificial heat element.
Thus we have what seems to be satisfaction of the requirements of
accidental death under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act.
In Michigan an entirely different approach is taken regarding the
compensability of workingmen stricken by heat prostration. Sunstroke is not a compensable accident in the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Michigan and at most may be regarded as an
occupational disease, not within the scope of the act.' 3 Michigan favors a strict policy because the Michigan court has declared that, as
the Compensation Statute is in derogation of the common law it must
be construed strictly. 14 An example of this strict view is the case of
an employee who while doing brick work around a boiler, was overcome by the intense heat generated by an adjoining boiler, and fell
from heatstroke, suffering injuries which led to his death. The Supreme Court of Michigan by a six to two decision reversed the award
of the Industrial Accident Board, and held that the employee Roach
was doing the work which he and his associates were employed to do,
exactly in the manner they expected to do it.' 5 Thus the court followed an earlier decision which denied compensation to a workingman
who ruptured himself while lifting an iron bar in his usual manner,
"1

Chapman Price Steel Co. v. Bertels, et al., 92

Ind.

App. 634 (1931).

138 Minn. 250, 164 N. W. 916, 15 N. C. C. A. 679 (1917).
18 13 A. L. R. 981 (1918).
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15 Roach v. Kelsy Wheel Co., 200 Mich. 299, 167 N. W. 33 (1918).
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because it was not in the nature of an accidental injury.'6 The manner in
which it is done is the guage of whether or not an accident has occurred.
A second Michigan case illustrating much the same opinion resulted
when a police patrolman was denied compensation for a death resulting from heatstroke while in the course of his duties. 17 The families
of both of these men undoubtedly would have received benefits under
the Indiana Compensation Act because they were subjected to far more
exposure than the general public, but the nature of their sunstroke was
classified as occupational disease and not as accidental injury suffered
in the course of employment.
A New York court advances still another'rule in determining whether
sunstroke is compensable or not in a case iii which the deceased employee, Campbell, died of heat prostration after a prolonged period of
excessive heat. He was a driver of a brewery wagon and had delivered ninety-one half barrels of beer between seven o'clock in the
morning and three o'clock in the afternoon. He stopped his horses
about this hour, alighted from his wagon and after walking around for
about ten minutes, he dropped dead. The commission which investigated this case found that Campbell's death was an accidental injury
which arose in the course of employment but that it did not arise out
8
of the employment, therefore no compensation could be allowed.'
In examining the English decisions we find a clear cut distinction
made between prostration caused by the rays of the sun and prostration caused by artificial heat. The former cases deny compensation
while in the latter, the employment is considered as the source of the
injury. The leading English case granting compensation from death
arising out of and in the course of employment is Ismay, Imri and Co.
v. Willizmson.19 A workman, who was starving, applied to a mission
for work and obtained employment raking ashes from a furnace. He
fell down in a faint while working at this job and died later in the
day. Because of his low vitality and the heat of his occupation his
case was deemed compensable. A plumber, also a man of impaired
vitality, was at work laying and joining pipes in a trench along a road
when he was overcome by sunstroke, but his death was held not an
accident arising out of his employment. 20 Referring once again to
the question of the heat of the sun's rays we shall notice two English
cases: A seaman on duty on a blackened steel deck for some hours
in the blazing sun with no shade, and the temperature standing at
1080 to 120', suffered blindness which was held compensable, 21 and
16
17

Kutschman v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 197 Mich. 146, 163 N. W. 933 (1917).
Doyle v. City of Saginaw, 258 Mich. 467, 243 N. W. 27 (1923).

18 Campbell v. Clausen-Flannagan Brewery, 183 N. Y. App. Div. 490, 171
N. Y. Supp. 522 (1918).
19 77 L. J. C. P. 107, 1 B. W. C. C. 232 (1908).
20 Davies v. Gillespie, 28 T. L. R. 6, 56 Sol. J. 11, 5 B. W. C. C. 64 (1911).
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a workman who was ordered to paint the side of a ship, on a hot day
was seized by sunstroke, and the injury was deemed compensable because the direct and indirect rays of the sun on the water and the
22
ship's side, created a greater than normal danger.
In summing up the various propositions advanced in our states and
in England, we find that when the industry through the agency of
man combines with the natural elements to produce an employee's injury this accidental injury is regarded as compensable. It is clear
that the injury should be charged to industrial hazards but it is an
open question whether the industry should be charged with injuries
resulting from the so called "acts of God." If every instance of heatstroke that occurs during working hours is compensable, benefits under
the compensation acts are mere equivalents of benefits under ordinary
health insurance policies, and the door is opened to interpreting said
23
acts as a kind of general social insurance.
George S. Stratigos and Richard H. Keen.

RENvoI IN AmERICA.-The problem of renvoi is stated by Lorenzen

to be this: "Whether the rules of the form should be interpreted as
adopting the foreign law in its totality, including its rules of the conflicts of law, or whether they should be deemed to incorporate only the
foreign internal law." 1 Or, in the words of Schreiber, "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law
for decision, is the reference to the corresponding rule of the Conflict
of Law of that foreign law, or is the reference to the corresponding
rule of internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality
of the foreign law, minus its Conflict of Laws rules?" 2 A literal
translation of the word renvoi means "sending" before a court. It has
two classifications: (a) remission, or reference back to the law of the
forum, and (b) transmission or reference on by the law of the forum.
When the court of the forum does adopt the foreign law in its
totality, including its conflict of laws law, it is using renvoi. What actually happens is that the matter is remitted back to the law of the
forum by the conflict of laws rules of the foreign jurisdiction.
22 Robson, Eckford & Co., Ltd. v. Blakey, 49 Sc. L. R. 254, 5 B. W. C. C.
536 (1912).
28 Ciocca v. National Sugar Refining Co., 124 N. J. L. 329, 12 A. (2d) 130
(1940).
1 Lorenzen, The Problem of Renvoi, 20 Columbia L. Rev. 247 (1920).
2 Schreiber, The Doctrine of Renvoi in Anglo American Law.

NOTES
The Datur cases constitutes an instance where the Michigan court
of the forum applied renvol. The facts were as follows:
A Michigan married woman, Clara A. Price, signed a note in Michigan, as surety for her husband, mailed the note to Chicago where subsequently a loan was made in Illinois by an Illinois corporation. Suit
arose in Michigan on the security note and the question was whether
the woman was liable. To understand fully how the court arrived at
its decision it is well here to examine the law of both Illinois and
Michigan as it existed at the time of the Datur case:
Illinois Law
1. Illinois Internal law says that a woman has the capacity to
sign notes binding her separate estate.
2. Illinois Conflicts of Laws law says that the capacity of a
the place of
woman to contract is govern~ed by the law of
4
execution of the instrument. Burr v. Beckler.
Michigan Law
3. Michigan Internal law says that a woman has not the capacity
to sign notes binding her separate estate.
4. Michigan Conflicts of Laws law says that the capacity of a
woman to contract is governed by the laws of the place of
contracting.
Now the first thing that the court did was to ascertain from the
facts that the place of contracting was Illinois, where the loan was
made. The next thing it did was to refer to the law of Illinois, but
it referred to the Conflict of Laws law of Illinois (No. 2 above). This
bounced the matter right back into Michigan because, by analogy to
the Illinois case of Burr v. Beckler, supra, Michigan was the place of
execution. At this point the Michigan court applied the Internal law
of Michigan (No. 3 above), and decided the case in favor of Clara A.
Price. She was not liable. The Michigan court used renvoi when it
referred to the Conflict of Laws law of Illinois (No. 2 above) instead
of to the Internal law of Illinois (No. 1 above).
There was a very strong dissent to the case by Justices Sharpe and
Butzel. They claimed that the law of the forum should control on
the question of lex loci contractus. They maintain that it was absurd
for the Michigan court to use the Illinois case of Burr v. Beckler,
supra, as an indication that the place of execution was Michigan.
Justice Butzel said, "Were we not to be controlled by our own law
and obliged each time to ascertain what a foreign state would have
held under similar circumstances, our decisions would be in hopeless
confusion, and it would be necessary each time to examine the decisions
3
4
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of other states in determining the lex loci contractus." The great
weight of authority in this country is certainly in accordance with this
view of Butzel. See The Theory of Qualifications and Conflict of
Laws, Professor Lorenzen, 5 in which he says, "Where two states, agree
for example that' the place of performance governs the validity of a
contract but they differ as to what constitutes place of perfomance,
the only way out is for the law of the forum to decide the place of
performance." It would be the same with the place of contracting:
"The law of the forum controls in determining the lex loci contractus
of a contract made by correspondence," Lorenzen. 5
It seems, therefore, that it would have been better if Michigan had
referred itself only to the Internal Law of Illinois and hence have decided that Clara A. Price was liable, under Illinois Internal Law.
There would have been no renvoi then.
Another objection to Michigan's use of the renvoi would be that
once Michigan had decided to apply the Conflict of Laws rule of
Illinois, why should it not, on the return to Michigan law from Illinois,
be consistent and apply the Michigan Conflict of Laws rule thus referring it back to Illinois again? To be consistent this would be the
only alternative and the result would be an endless tossing of the question back and forth, a circulis inextricabilis.
A further observation upon the Datur case reveals two interesting
facts:
1. Had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi doctrine, judgment
would have been against the woman.
2. If the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they
too rejected renvoi, judgment would be for the woman.
In the case of Wooley v. Lyon 6 the court used renvoi as an excuse
to bolster up and support its decision: "If, therefore as counsel contend, the law of the place where the indorsement was made, the law
of Illinois, governs the sufficiency of the notice of dishonor in this
case, that notice was good, for it was sufficient under the law of Canada
where the note was payable, and the law of Illinois was that in a case
of this character the law of the place where the note was payable
governed the time and manner of giving the notice of dishonor."
The case that without doubt has led the trend against renvoi in the
United States is that of the Matter of Tallmadge.7 Held in the Surrogate's court of New York, it clearly disposed of the matter of renvoi
in the State of New York and served as a model for the other states
to follow when similar situations presented themselves. The facts were
5
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these: Coster Chadwick died a citizen of New York, domiciled in
France. Under the French Civil Code the testator's aunt, Mrs. Tallmadge, would receive the entire residuary estate but if the will were
construed under New York law, the aunt would share with the testator's brother. Section 47 of the New York Decedent Estate Law requires that the disposition of a decedent's property be governed by the
law of his domicile; but an expert on the French law testified that the
French courts would apply the national law of the testator, which in
this case would be the law of New York.
The referee, Winthrop, said, "The courts and writers sanctioning
renvoi would insist that in such a case as that at bar the New York
court, acting under section 47, must apply the French law, meaning
not the territorial law of France, but the totality of French law, including its method of determining questions of conflict of laws, and
that therefore it will apply the New York law, for the French view
of the conflict ol laws refers the construction of the will to the national
law of the testator. Under this view the New York court would accept
the reference." And he goes on to say, "But logically, why should the
inquiry stop with the internal law of New York on the reference from
the French court?" ... "The renvoi doctrine is not supported by reason. It inconsistently requires either the application of internal New
York law after the reference by the French law, although the first
reference had been from New York to the French Conflict of Laws
rule, or the endless reference back and forth, which has been called a
circulis inextricabilis."
Winthrop made the point that the New York court was created and
exists for the purpose of enforcing the New York law, including the
state's own rules as to the Conflict of Laws. And further "If renvoi
be no part of the New York law, even though it be a part of the law
of France, a New York court will apply French internal or territorial
law. according to the provisions of section 47." He then went on to
say that in his opinion renvoi is no part of New York law and that
therefore the French internal or territorial law should apply to the
case and the entire estate should go to Mrs. Tallmadge. In analyzing
the reasons for his decision he said, "The naked question is that stated
by Labbe, 'When a lawgiver abandons to a foreign system of law
the determination of a legal question, does he ask this system of law
to decide what law is applicable, or does he seek in this system the
solution which the legal question ought to receive?'" And, "As already stated, it is a part of the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that a will
be construed according to the law of testator's domicile and this principle is embodied in the section 47 of the Decedent Estate Law. This
is the New York rule on the Conflict of Laws in reference to this question. For a court to hold that the Legislature meant that the French
Conflict of Laws rule is to apply the New York internal law to be en-

